In this article we offer visual depictions and analysis of contextual factors relative to the presence of public safety networks (PSNs) in the United States (U.S.). A PSN combines shared technological infrastructures for supporting information sharing, computing interoperability and interagency interactions involving policing, criminal justice, and emergency response. The broad research objective is to explain the formation of PSNs based upon factors derived from rational choice and institutional theories. To do so we develop maps to represent our data analysis.
INTRODUCTION
Public safety is a persistent and increasingly central concern to both policymakers and the public. Catastrophic events such as the September 11 th attacks and hurricanes Katrina and Ike concentrate the public's attention and illustrate to policymakers the need for effective public safety agencies capable of preventing and/or responding to such events (Government Accountability This work is motivated by a desire to contribute to improving the conceptual understanding and theoretical development of design principles and parameters for inter-organizational systems (IOS) and, in particular, the type of IOS we are calling PSNs. We aim to provide empirical and conceptual guidance for policing and public safety work, and public-safety infrastructure development more generally. To do this, we draw on two theoretical lenses:
rational choice theory and institutional theory. As we detail below, the rational choice perspective focuses attention on agencies' needs for ICT support, the resources required, and the costs of participating in PSN
formation. An institutional perspective, in contrast, focuses attention on the shared values, norms, and regulations that shape PSN formation and the processes by which these elements become shared.
To do this work we draw on the most comprehensive PSN data set yet assembled. We know that PSN collaborations exist at local, state and regional levels in the U.S. and this makes identification of these a difficult task. As detailed below, to date we have compiled a data set containing detailed descriptions of 169 PSNs from a number of secondary sources. Supplementing the PSN data are a corresponding set of contextual data primarily focused on characteristics and descriptors of potentially relevant state-level attributes.
Here we present our initial analysis of these two data sets, using state-by-state maps of PSNs and corresponding state-level contextual data. Through these maps we are able to explore theoretically-driven questions about where
PSNs are most likely to occur and why. For example, we mapped the geographic distribution of PSNs in the United States from which we are able to discern patterns of development related to geographical variables such as population, land mass, international borders, and coastlines. The next phase of this work will be to supplement these initial analyses with new primary data that address in more depth issues relative to the governance and technological arrangements of PSNs and indicators of their achieved outcomes and overall success.
The paper continues in five additional sections. In the next section we describe the PSN phenomenon and our motivations for studying their formation. In section three we review rational choice and institutional explanations of PSN formation. We report on our collection and use of secondary data about PSNs and their contexts in section four. In section five we illustrate our preliminary analyses with selected maps; and in section six we show how these analyses may be used for further explorations and theoretical development. We conclude with a discussion of the contributions of our work.
WHY STUDY PUBLIC SAFETY NETWORKS
Like other areas of government looking to improve inter-agency collaboration, public safety agencies have begun to set up IOS to support existing and new relationships. We define a PSN as a particular type of IOS that is formed when groups of public sector agencies and private organizations come together to collaborate on issues related to information-sharing and the concomitant need to develop and share ICT across existing agency/organizational boundaries for the purpose of improving public safety (e.g., NASCIO, 2003 Funding or procurement restrictions also play a significant role in PSN formation. For example, funds might specifically be offered as incentives to government agencies that can demonstrate "transformational government"
progress through dramatically improved offender record management, analysis and reporting. Alternatively, funds might be earmarked for a specific program such as community-oriented policing. These pressures influence how scarce resources are allocated.
Even with a commitment to pursue a PSN, public safety agencies also have highly varied ICT infrastructures in terms of their amount of "legacy" technology, their use of custom developed or COTS (commercial off-the-shelf) software, and the nature of the data collected or shared by participating agencies. Incompatible arrangements of ICT can affect the ability of governmental agencies to join up with others whose ICT is configured differently.
Simply: operational issues such as the form and nature of ICT infrastructure often play a strong shaping role in PSN formation.
Given the range of forces acting on PSNs, we argue there are two theoretical perspectives that provide insight into PSN formation -rational choice and institutional. We elaborate on these perspectives below.
The Rational Choice Perspective
Rational choice theories focus attention on the decisions made by organizations attempting to maximize utility within their environment (Scott, 2004) . The premise of the rational choice perspective is that organizational decision-makers have the ability to systematically identify and then choose best alternatives based on certain criteria (e.g. costs and benefits) to achieve a desired outcome (e.g. improved efficiency). Rational choice theorists view the organization as having control (agency) regarding its future: that is, they are able to operate on their environment to a greater extent than the environment influences them. Thus external factors play a secondary role: their presence shapes action by providing evidence, but the organization retains the ability to make decisions it sees as best to reach its desired outcomes.
Relative to PSN formation, rational choice theories hold that agencies make choices about whether to participate in collaborations and what kinds of collaborations to form on the basis of "efficiency" and/or effectiveness concerns such as expected performance improvements (Alexander, 1995; Gil-Garcia, 2005; Ostrom, 1991) . From this perspective, key issues for deciding on forming PSNs are: agencies' needs for public safety performance enhancement; the resources required to meet those needs; and the costs of PSN participation or rejection (See Table 1 ). "Needs" entail demands and requirements placed upon the agency by external organizations and private citizens. "Resources" provide capabilities and raw materials to the agency to meet the demands/requirements placed upon them. "Costs" involve the expenses and barriers of participating in the PSN (including, monetary, human resource time, or equipment allocations).
<insert table 1 here>
States and their governments can differ on all three rational choice dimensions (needs, resources, costs), leading to the expectation that PSN formation will be unequally distributed across states. For example, having a greater population, an international border, or a higher crime rate become "needs" that may lead a state to choose to form a PSN. The rational choice perspective suggests that variations in state's "resources" such as funding, equipment provision, and technological expertise will help predict PSN formations. Likewise, variations in a state's "cost" factors relative to service delivery fees, the form and reliability of the ICT infrastructure, or the need for training, will alter the propensity to form a PSN as an alternative to current approaches to obtaining information.
The three dimensions of the rational choice perspective provide a framework for predicting PSN formation. For example, it may be that the presence of a PSN will be positively related to "needs" factors such as high crime rates or high population counts, positively related to "resource" factors such as funding levels and sources, and negatively related to "cost" factors such as quality of existing ICT infrastructure. Although the impact of these factors is frequently cited as key to the decision to form an inter-agency collaboration (e.g., Fedorowicz et al., 2007; Fedorowicz, et al, 2008) , there has been little to no documented research to characterize the underlying relationship.
Although the rational choice perspective provides researchers with a way to explain how organizational decisionmakers evaluate and choose among alternatives, it remains incomplete. Chief among the weaknesses is that rational choice approaches neglect social influences. Actions do not happen in a vacuum but are rather "embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations" (Granovetter, 1985) .
The Institutional Perspective
Organizational scholars have come to view organizations as existing in complex social environments where rationality is challenged by social constructions. Moreover, organizational decision-makers and other actors in organizations respond to the influences and pressures exerted on them by their social environments and, in turn, this limits the organizations' agency. This view of organizations, known collectively as institutional theory, is a powerful tool in its own right that also has been shown to be complementary to rational choice theory (Ostrom, 1991) . While there are many variants of institutional theory (Scott, 1987) , in general, institutional theories move beyond assumptions of rationality and efficiency to include socially constructed beliefs, norms, and rules and the impact of these social constructions on the behavior of organizations. Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that organizations do not adopt organizational structures and forms rationally but rather incorporate socially-mediated (institutionalized) structures to achieve legitimacy, and may do so regardless of the impact on efficiency.
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) theorize that organizations became more similar via isomorphic pressures and posit three forms of institutional isomorphism -coercive, mimetic and normative (See Table 2 ). Coercive isomorphism is the pressure a less-powerful, dependent organization faces from powerful organizations. Specific examples include the pressures felt by an organization to respond to legal and political bodies -such as a PSN needing to respond to HIPAA information-sharing requirements. Mimetic isomorphism is the tendency of an organization to mimic other organizations -such as the tendency for one police department to have similar structure and procedures as others nearby. Mimetic isomorphism is viewed as one means to respond to uncertainty; in uncertain environments organizations will mimic those organizations seen to be successful. Finally, normative isomorphism articulates the pressures arising from the professionalism that is linked to formal education and professional networks and associations, which is one explanation for the shared belief systems among police officers that Manning (2003) observes. Examples of each of the three sources of pressure are included in Table 2 .
<insert institutional perspective is that it is premised on the influence of forces external to the actors. This leads to a focus on the larger external environment in which an organization operates as well as the historical influences within that environment, which are important elements to consider when investigating organizations in the historically rich, environmentally complex public sector.
Complementary Nature of Rational Choice and Institutional Perspectives
While often seen as alternatives, institutional theory and rational choice theory can be complementary in explaining organizational phenomena (Tingling & Parent, 2004; Tolbert, 1985) . Specific to digital government research, scholars have argued the importance of analyzing phenomena from multiple theoretical lenses. For example, Gil-Garcia and Pardo (2005) argue that governments must look beyond cost reduction or increased efficiency to consider political, legal and other institutional influences. More specifically, and based on a study of the determinants of governance structure for cross-boundary information sharing in government Pardo, et al.
(2008) detail both rational choice and institutional factors.
As applied to PSNs, the rational choice perspective frames agencies as making decisions regarding the formation of a PSN by focusing on needs, resources and costs and that these decisions reflect careful attention to optimizing for efficiency on some set of defined criteria. The institutional perspective, in contrast, is premised on the situated location of agencies where decisions about the formation of a PSN are influenced by ongoing social relations and a complex environment. These decisions are influenced by other organizations and contextual pressures. While powerful on their own, combined, the theories show great promise for improved understanding of PSN formation.
DATA: SOURCES, COLLECTION & USE
To explore these theoretical explanations for PSN formation in the United States, we have engaged in an ongoing process of data collection and analysis. We have assembled two large data sets from secondary sources, one comprising indicators of rational choice and institutional factors at the state level, the second comprising published data on individual PSNs. We developed these data sets by gathering and analyzing a wide range of secondary data sources such as reports from governmental and non-governmental agencies, detailed literature reviews, careful attention to announcements in the professional and public press, and through connections to PSN professionals established in prior research. professional associations such as NASCIO 4 , and independent and university-based research centers 5 .
Using additional secondary sources, we have identified and captured public information about 169 PSNs. We learned about these collaborations through Web searches of research sites such as SEARCH 6 , from federal, state and local Web sites, through newspaper articles, and a wide range of trade press publications 7 . We also attended PSN-oriented conferences and consulted with professionals at government agencies and independent research centers in an attempt to complete our inventory of PSNs across all levels of government. These efforts continue, as new PSNs are announced or begin operations, or as we encounter new sources of information.
One particularly promising approach to analyzing and presenting this large and diverse data set involves the visual display of data by means of maps that can be superimposed to reveal different kinds of relationships, particularly between the incidence of PSNs and presence of various rational choice or institutional factors. This analysis is demonstrated in the following section, in which we focus on the distribution of PSNs in each state in conjunction with state-level indicators for participation in PSNs. 3 See http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pubalp2.htm and http://www.census.gov. 4 See http://www.NASCIO.org. 5 See for example, http://gpponline.org and http://www.duc.auburn.edu/outreach/cgs/AllDocuments/ASAPLetter.pdf. It is not feasible to represent all of the contextual factors we have assembled in our data set here. The maps chosen for inclusion are representative of the categories of rational choice and institutional factors described in the literature review. The illustrative factor maps are then superimposed upon the maps of PSN density to demonstrate the usefulness of this technique.
MAPPING PUBLIC SAFETY NETWORKS
We begin by presenting a visual depiction of the geographic distribution of PSNs from our data set. Figure 1 graphically depicts state-level PSNs. State-level PSNs are those where the majority of members are state agencies.
Similarly, a county, city or metropolitan-area PSN reflects majority membership of similar agencies. To illustrate how the maps will be useful in exploring and visualizing the answers to our research questions, we next present cartographic representations of two "needs"-related (rational choice theory) variables. In this domain, the most general statement of agency needs would be that of enhancing public safety performance. A large population multiplies the number of law abiding citizens who must be protected and law breakers who must be apprehended. It also affects, through the size of the tax base, the resources available to address those needs. A high number of violent crimes presents statistical evidence of a threat that is actual, of a serious type and elevated level. Figure 3 As shown in Figure 3 , the crime rate is higher in Southern states and lower in the North Central states. Figure 4 shows that the most densely populous areas are the Northeast, Florida, Texas, Illinois and California. Juxtaposing these two maps, as shown in Figure 5 , it becomes apparent that dense population is not a strong indicator of high crime rates, and that in fact some of the least populous states have high rates of crime. This makes clear that there
are not direct linkages among rational choice variables: the linkage among rational choice factors is, seemingly, more complex, even though both seem to play a role in the emergence of PSNs.
<insert Figure 5 here>
Mapping crime rate and population over total PSN density ( Figures 6 and 7) suggests a relationship between PSN incidence and these two "needs" factors. Visual inspection suggests that PSNs are more frequently located in highly populated areas and those with high violent crime rates. This can be confirmed empirically. A crosstabulation of the bivariate relationships between PSN categories and crime rate categories yields Tau b correlation coefficients of +.290 (state level) and +.452 (total number). Between population categories and PSN categories, the coefficients are +.238 (state) and +.474 (total number). A multiple regression model entering both population and crime rate as independent variables explain 66% of the variation in total PSNs (see Table 3 ). 9 depicts an institutional measure of potential "coercion". State general expenditures, which are highly correlated with state expenditures in specific categories such as law enforcement and over time, represent budget appropriations within which public agencies must work each year. There generally is little money for unbudgeted expenses and limited flexibility to move budgeted monies into other needs categories. The number of full-time officers delimits the (trained) staffing resources that can be allocated to meeting or enhancing public safety needs. Figures 8, 9 and 10 present these data through map overlays. As shown in Table 4 , their relationships with PSN density are of the same magnitude as those for violent crime and population. High multi-collinearity (coefficients greater than .7) precludes entering these variables into a regression model together and/or with population.
<insert figures 8, 9 and 10 here>
DISCUSSION
The representations presented here reveal the level of PSN activity in the US and the complex political, economic, social and technological issues that influence their creation and characteristics. The population and crime rate maps are illustrative of a large array of possible overlays. Other factors of interest are given in Tables 1 and 2 , which in themselves represent only a fraction of the factors for which we have accumulated state-level data.
The use of maps to depict PSN location provides a useful and simple technique to support the face validity of individual rational choice or institutional factor relationships. The maps we have constructed to date suggest that rational choice provides some insight when compared with PSN density, showing clear links (or lack of links) between needs factors and PSN density, thus suggesting these help predict formation. However, the mapped data suggest that individual institutional factors are not as powerful predictors of PSN location, and should be examined in combination with other explanatory factors. Clearly, more work is needed to understand how to best apply and interpret cartographic techniques.
Data Aggregation and Interpretation Challenges
Our initial representations raise challenging questions about data aggregation and representation. For example, we aggregated violent crime rates by state, but it could be argued that crime is fundamentally a local phenomenon. A public safety initiative may have been formed in response to perceptions that the crime rate was too high in the state or in response to perceptions that the crime rate was too high in a particular county or local area only. Our separation of PSNs by level (state versus local) may be useful in shedding light on such questions.
We know that population and crime are not evenly distributed across geographic and jurisdictional boundaries.
This condition is problematic with respect to political influences and power. For example, a city like Chicago may have a high crime rate, while crime rates in the rest of the state remains relatively low. The Illinois legislature has been dominated historically by downstate interests and thus may not respond to a high average crime rate that they see as skewed by the inclusion of the Chicago metropolitan area. Moreover, many parts of Chicago may have low crime rates, or varying rates of particular crimes that may not be considered violent crimes (e.g., drug sales versus domestic abuse); thus, different locations within a region may have very different interests relative to policing and public safety. This means that the formation of PSNs may be a contentious political activity. Future PSN analyses may require more granular analyses, perhaps breaking out county, city and metropolitan area PSNs in addition to those at the state level, or comparative analyses of factors with varying levels of aggregation.
As we conceptualize them, population and crime rates are indications of "needs" for PSNs. However, "needs" can be understood in subjective as well as objective terms. Florida may have one of the highest crime rates in the country, ostensibly favoring PSN formation. However, crime fighting may not have a high political priority in Florida compared with health care, home foreclosures, or environmental management-a situation clearly less favorable for the formation of PSNs. Future work is needed to represent political priorities as an institutional complement to objective, rational choice measures of "needs".
Predicting PSN formation is complicated by the complexity inherent in the wide range of factors that comprise potential rational choice and institutional theory explanations for their formation. Analysis of these relationships is compounded by the difficulty of acquiring current, complete and usable data about the factors and the PSNs themselves. The number of potential rational choice and institutional factors that lend themselves to explanation of PSN formation is considerable. High levels of multi-collinearity among many of these factors make it difficult to perform some forms of traditional quantitative analyses.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Public safety continues to be a critical concern for all governments, from the local to national levels. Government The data mapping activities described above represent one component of a large and ongoing research project. For this effort, data collection has focused mainly on secondary sources which tend to publish quantifiable data that more readily reflects rational choice factors related to needs, resources and costs. However, we are in the process of adding additional primary data by means of interviews with leaders of individual PSNs to obtain additional understanding of the settings in which they reside. These first person accounts will permit analysis based on institutional factors that are not readily accessible through secondary sources, leading to more understanding of what makes PSNs form, and further, the factors that lead to PSN success.
Even at this stage, however, it seems clear that our data and analytic approach is productive in identifying patterns that can help explain the existence and distribution of PSNs. 11 . However, these inventories have a much more limited focus and scope than ours. We are in the process of setting up a mechanism by which our inventory can be updated to preserve its currency and shared with fellow researchers and PSN developers. This alone, we believe, is an important contribution, to practitioners as well as to academics.
A second contribution lies in our approach to describing and classifying PSNs, only the bare outlines of which we have discussed here. We expected to find, but did not, a clear consensus in the academic or trade literatures on the different types of PSNs or the important bases by which to distinguish them. We have created a wide array of clearly defined PSN descriptors to support future comparative analyses of PSNs and related initiatives in other domains of practice. We believe that this descriptive approach will be useful for other researchers interested in inter-organizational collaboration or in ICT governance and management.
Finally, most studies of interagency collaborations, in the public safety or other domains, rely on single case studies or on a small number of cases (e.g., Fedorowicz, et al, 2007; Sawyer & Tyworth, 2006) . Our approach attempts to combine the in-depth analysis of richly characterized PSNs with a large sample, if not the entire population of, ICT-related inter-organizational collaborations in the public safety domain. Our characterization is grounded in a strong theoretical base, as presented in this article. By drawing on these rational choice and institutional perspectives, we are able to compile a data set of state attributes that will be useful in analyzing a large variety of public sector inter-organizational collaborations. For these reasons, we expect that our exploration of PSNs will make a useful contribution to the literature on digital government. 
